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THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 REVISITED: THE
NEED FOR FURTHER REFORM
SCOTT C. WHITNEY*

Approximately four months after President Ford signed into law the
Trade Act of 1974, 1 the first petition for import relief was filed invoking
the "liberalized" provisions of Title II. 2 In the three years since the effective date of the 1974 Act, the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) has instituted investigations concerning a wide variety of commodities.3 Nonetheless, even though Congress by enacting the 1974 Act intended to minimize the President's control over trade policy and to make
import relief more accessible to both industry and labor, the ITC's recommendations have rarely been followed. This article will analyze the ineffectiveness of the 1974 Act by outlining the background of this new statute,
discussing the resolution of specific cases faced by the ITC since 1974, and
considering reasons why the Act has not lived up to original expectations.
Changes will be suggested which are necessary to achieve a viable international trade policy. Specifically, the article will focus on the critical issue of
the extent to which the Executive has been responsive to the findings and
recommendations of the ITC in those reports which have made affirmative
determinations and have recommended import relief of various kinds.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRADE ACT OF

1974

Under the Trade Act of 1974, import relief may take the form of
offsetting duty increases, tariff rate quotas, quantitative restrictions, use of
orderly marketing agreements with foreign countries, or any combination
of these measures. 4 Furthermore, adjustment assistance for workers, firms,
and communities is available under the statute as a satisfactory alternative
to import relief. 5 This article, however, will not analyze which specific type
':'A.B., University of Nevada; J.D., Harvard University; Professor of Law, College of
William and Mary. The author wishes to thank Philip H. Bane, a third year law student at the
College of William and Mary, for his valuable assistance in researching and drafting this article.
1
19 u.s.c. §§ 2101-2487 (1976).
2
!d. §§ 2251-2394. Tide II of the Trade Act of 1974 deals with means of providing relief from injury caused by "fair" but injurious import competition. As will become clear later
in this article, import relief is easier to obtain under Tide II than under previous legislation.
3
The ITC will institute an investigation upon the filing of a petition for import relief
by an industry, a firm, a labor group, the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Ways and
Means Committee, the President, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, or upon
the initiative of the ITC itself. !d. § 2251(a)(1), (b)(1).
4
!d. § 2253.
"!d. § 2251(d)(l)(B). The available adjustment assistance provisions are set forth in id.
§§ 2271-2374. Trade adjustment assistance for workers, administered by the Secretary of
Labor, provides benefits up to 70 percent of a worker's average weekly wage for a period of
12 months, employment counseling, retraining, job search allowances, and advances to assist in
relocating if necessary for reemployment. !d. §§ 2271-2322. Adjustment for firms, administered by the Secretary of Commerce, includes technical assistance and direct loans, or loan
guarantees to assist such firms to modernize or convert to other manufacturing activities. !d.
§§ 2341-2354. Adjustment assistance for communities, also administered by the Secretary of
Commerce, includes technical assistance and loans or loan guarantees to help develop recovery
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of relief may be the most appropriate remedy in a particular situation. Instead, the focus will be on what institutional decision-making structure is
best suited to determine when import relief is warranted. In order to understand fully the problems related to trade policy and the allocation of
decision-making responsibility, it is necessary to outline briefly the history
and structure of the Trade Act of 1974.
Congress has the power to enact legislation concerning international
trade policy under its plenary constitutional authority to "lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts" and "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.'' 0
Despite this power, Congress since 1934 has periodically delegated to the
President specific and limited power to negotiate reciprocal tariff and trade
concessions with foreign nations. 7 Until the Trade Act of 1974 was passed,
the most recent congressional delegation of authority to the President to
negotiate trade agreements was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.8 The
President's authority under this Act terminated June 30, 1967.
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, an industry was entitled to
import relief only when the following four prerequisites were met: 9
(1) imports of an article similar to or competitive with one produced by the domestic industry were increasing;
(2) the increased imports were the result of trade agreement
concessions;
(3) the domestic industry was suffering injury: and
(4) the increased imports were the major factor causing or
threatening to cause the serious injury. 10

The President under the Act of 1962 was granted absolute discretion to accept or reject recommendations made by the United States Tariff Commission. 11 In short, the Tariff Commission's functions concerning import relief
were investigatory and fact-finding in nature and the Commission lacked
any effective decisional power.
Since ultimate power over trade policy was granted to the President
and the role of the Tariff Commission was merely advisory, the statutory
scheme of the 1962 Act was at variance with the long recognized view that
"important advantages derive from congressional delegation of regulatory
power to specialized agencies which can provide a continuity of surveillance
and expertise over complex economic matters and that these advantages
are normally unavailable in the three constitutional branches of governplans, to attract new industry, or to convert existing plants to more economically viable activities. I d. §§ 2371-2374.
6
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
7 See generally Whitney, The Trade Act of 1974: Coping with Unequal Environmmtal Control
Costs, 16 B.C. IND. & Cm1. L. REv. 577 (1975).
8
Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (formerly codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991
(1970)).
9 The prerequisites resulted from the United States Tariff Commission's interpretation
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (formerly
codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970)). The United States Tariff Commission has been
changed to the International Trade Commission. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (1976).
10
Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 302(b), 76 Stat. 883 (1962) (formerly codified at 19 U.S.C. §
1901(b)(1970)). See UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON NONRUD·
BERFOOTWEAR, INVESTIGATION No. 359 (1971).
11
Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 302, 76 Stat. 885 (1962) (formerly codified.at 19 U.S.C. § 1902
(1970)).
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ment." 12 Accordingly, the 1962 Act was anomalous in that the special expert Commission was given the authority to evaluate complex trade issues
and reach detailed conclusions, yet it was denied the power to implement
these findings and conclusions. 13 Congress dealt with this anomaly when it
realigned decision-making responsibility concerning trade policy and tried
to improve the worsening competitive position of American domestic business by enacting the 1974 legislation.
Under the 1974 Act, upon receiving an affirmative determination
from the ITC and a recommendation as to remedies, the President is required to make his decision within 60 days after receiving the ITC report. 14
In determining whether to provide import relief and what method and
amount of import relief to provid~, the President must take into account in
addition to such other considerations as he may deem relevant:
(1) information and advice from the Secretary of Labor on the

extent to which workers in the industry have applied for, are receiving, or are likely to receive adjustment assistance under part
2 of this subchapter or benefits from other manpower programs;
(2) information and advice from the Secretary of Commerce on
the extent to which firms in the industry have applied for, are
receiving, or are likely to receive adjustment assistance under
parts 3 and 4 of this subchapter;
(3) the probable effectiveness of import relief as a means to
promote adjustment, the efforts being made or to be implemented by the industry concerned to adjust to import competition, and other considerations relative to the position of the industry in the Nation's economy;
(4) the effect of import relief on consumers (including the price
and availability of the imported article and the like or directly
competitive article produced in the United States) and on competition in the domestic markets for such articles;
(5) the effect of import relief on the international economic
interests of the United States;
(6) the impact on United States industries and firms as a consequence of any possible modification of duties or other import
restrictions which may result from international obligations with
respect to compensation;
(7) the geographic concentration of imported products marketed
in the United States;
(8) the extent to which the United States market is the focal
point for exports of such article by reason of restraints on exports of such article to, or on imports of such article into, third
country markets; and
(9) the economic and social costs which would be incurred by
taxpayers, communities, and workers, if import relief were or
were not provided. 15
Whitney, The Trade Act of 1974: Coping with Unequal Environmental Control Costs, 16
& CoM. L. REV. 577, 599 (1975).
13 I d.
14
19 u.s.c. § 2252(b)(1976).
15 Id. § 2252(c).
12

B.C. IND.

841

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

Clearly the requirement that the President take into consideration the
above factors is an important difference from the 1962 legislation which, as
previously noted, granted the chief executive complete discretion in accepting or rejecting a Tariff Commission recommendation.
If the President determines not to proclaim the import relief recommended by the ITC, he must report this decision to Congress, which has
the power to override the President's determination and to effectuate the
ITC's recommendation by a simple majority vote taken within 90 days of
the President's report to Congress. 16 The provision of the Act giving Congress the power to override the President is one of the clearest indications
that the legislature intended that the President not be given absolute authority in an area requiring special expertise. 17
In addition to being procedurally different from the 1962 Act, the
1974 legislation also includes important substantive changes. Unlike the
1962 Act, the Trade Act of 1974 does not require establishment of a causal
link between increased imports and grant of trade agreement concessions. 18
Furthermore, the 1974 Act relaxes the criteria regarding the extent to
which imports must have contributed to the injury to an industry. Accordingly, the ITC need only find that increased imports are or threaten to become a "substantial cause" of serious injury, 19 a term defined by the Act to
mean a cause that is "not less than any other cause."20
16

19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l)(l976).
Other changes in the new law are important: the term of office of the Commissioners
was extended from six to nine years and the chairman and vice-chairman are to be appointed
on the basis of seniority rather than by presidential designation. Id. § 1330(b)(c). Compensation for each member of the Commission was increased and, more importantly, the budget of
the Commission is to be approved directly by Congress rather than by the Office of Management and Budget. Id. § 2232. The 1974 Act also gave the Commission authority to hire its
own attorneys and to represent itself in all judicial proceedings whereas previously the Commission was required to request the justice Department for such assistance. S. REP. No. 1298,
93d Gong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). Furthermore, Congress has also ensured that it will be wellinformed when making decisions:
The Act increases from two to five the number of congressional advisors to be
appointed from each house to oversee international trade negotiations. The Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee are to nominate the advisors from among their own respective members, and the nominees
are to be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House. In addition, the Act requires that the Private Advisory Committee
for Trade Negotiations, a committee chaired by the Special Trade Representative
and composed of 45 representatives of government, labor, industry, agriculture,
consumer interests and the general public, be given full access to all data concerning negotiating objectives and the progress of negotiations. The Act further
requires that the committee issue formal advisory opinions to Congress indicating
whether pending trade agreements would achieve equity and reciprocity.
Whitney, The Trade Act of 1974: Coping with Unequal Environmental Control Costs, 16 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. REV. 577, 598-99 (1975) (footnotes omitted). For an extended discussion of the Trade
Act of 1974 and its background see Whitney, supra.
18
19 u.s.c. § 2251 (1976).
19 Id. § 225l(b)(l).
20
Id. § 225l(b)(4). As to workers, the Secretary of Labor must find
(I) that a significant number or proportion of the workers in such worker's
firm or an appropriate subdivision of the firm have become totally or partially
separated, or are threatened to become totally or partially separated,
(2) that sales or production, or both, of such firm or subdivision have decreased absolutely, and
(3) that increases of imports or articles like or directly competitive with articles produced by such worker's firm or an appropriate subdivision thereof "con842
17
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II.

CASE STUDIES OF lTC DECISIONS

In order to understand why the 1974 Act has not lived up to expectations, it is necessary to analyze case studies of lTC decisons and the presidential and congressional responses. It will become clear that Presidents
have ignored lTC recommendations without good reason and that the
Congress has failed to assert itself by overruling executive decisions. After
the case studies have been presented, reforms will be suggested which
would compel the President to give lTC recommendations proper consideration and would conclusively realign the decision-making responsibility
concerning American import policy.
A. Presidential Disposition of lTC Recommendations for Import Relief

1. Specialty Steel
The earliest ITC investigation which resulted in an affirmative determination and a recommendation of import relief dealt with stainless
steel and alloy tool steeJ.2 1 This investigation was instituted on August 5,
1975 upon receipt of a petition filed on July 16, 1975 by the Tool and
Stainless Steel Industry Committee for Import Relief and the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CI0. 22 The investigation was undertaken to determine whether certain items of steel were being imported into the United
States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause or threat of
serious injury to the domestic industry producing articles of steel like or directly competitive with the imported articles. 23
After a public hearing and the receipt of briefs submitted by interested parties, the Commission recommended quantitative limitations beginning with calendar year 1976 through calendar year 1980 for the
specified classes of articles for which affirmative determinations were
made. 24 The quantitative limit was fixed at the amount of the average annual imports for each of the specified classes of articles-adjusted upward
to the nearest 100 short tons-for the calendar years 1970 to 1974 inclusive.25
tributed importantly" to such total or partial separation, or threat thereof, and to
such decline in sales or production.
ld. § 2272. For individual firms the Secretary of Commerce must make the same findings as
those required for relief of worker injury. /d. § 2341(c). The term "contributed importantly" is
defined as "a cause which is important, but not necessarily more important than any other
cause." Id. §§ 2272, 234l(c).
21
UNITED STATI:S INTERNATIONAL TRADE Co~mlSSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN.
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-5 (january 16, 1976) [hereinafter cited as TA-201-5].
22 /d. at I.
23
Specifically the investigation concerned:
ingots, blooms, billets, slabs and sheet bars; bars; wire rods; and plates, sheets
and strip, not cut, not pressed, and not stamped to nonrectangular shape; all the
foregoing of stainless steel, alloy tool steel, or silicon electrical steel, provided for
in items 608.18, 608.52, 608.76, 608.78, 608.85, 608.88, 609.06, 609.07 and
609.08 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), and as additionally
subject to duty under items 607.01 through 607.04, inclusive of the TSUS.
/d. Subsequently, on October 3, 1975, the Commission, at the request of the petitioner and for
other reasons, amended the scope of the investigation by deleting silicon electrical steel provided for in TSUS items 608.88 and 609.07. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,580 (1975).
24
TA-201-5, supra note 21, at 4-5.
25
I d. at 4-6.
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President Ford did not follow the ITC's recommendations and announced his intention to negotiate orderly marketing agreements with key
supplying countries during the ensuing 90 days. However, the President
indicated that if satisfactory agreements were not negotiated successfully,
he intended to proclaim import quotas at the overall level recommended by
the ITC for a period of three years to take effect on June 14, 1976. 20
The President presented two grounds justifying this action. First, he
concluded that the ITC's five year recommendation was "too inflexible in
view of the rapid expansions and contractions of the specialty steel market.
During a recession period, imports would not be sufficiently constrained to
prevent a recurrence of the problems encountered [in 1975]."27 Second,
the President asserted that the ITC's remedy "[did] not take into account
special factors affecting certain foreign supplying countries."28
The President's failure to follow the ITC's recommendations was ill' advised. As to the President's first basis for rejecting the ITC recommendation, it is difficult to understand how imposition of what is effectively lesser
import relief (three years stability instead of five), would provide more protection in case of recession. Moreover, should a recession occur, the quantitative limitations recommended by the ITC could be expeditiously adjusted
on a unilateral basis to meet current conditions. If "flexibility" is critical, as
the President suggested, then orderly marketing agreements would be less
appropriate because changes in such agreements would involve further
bilateral negotiations. Finally, the second so-called "basis" for departing
from the ITC remedy amounted to little more than preemptory dismissal
of the ITC recommendation since the President did not disclose the special
factors affecting certain foreign supplying countries which should have
been taken into consideration.
On June 11, 1976, after failing to negotiate satisfactory orderly marketing agreements, President Ford imposed quantitative restrictions on the
importation of the subject specialty steel items. 29 Subsequently, on the basis
of advice from the ITC and the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor, and
without reciting any substantive reason to justify his decision, President
Carter announced "that the exclusion of alloy tool steel provided for in
item 923.25 [of the Tariff Schedules of the United States] from such quantitative restrictions is in the national interest."30 The President made no
pretense of considering the criteria he is required to take into account
under the 1974 Act, and made a unilateral decision which should have
been made by the administrative agency possessing expertise in the area.
Unfortunately, Congress failed to intervene in the controversy concerning
steel and did not override the President's action.
2. Footwear
Upon receipt of a petition filed August 20, 1975 by the American
Footwear Industries Association, the Boot and Shoe Worker's Union, and
the United Shoe Workers of America, the ITC instituted an investigation
26
The President also directed the Secretary of Labor to expedite processing of applications for trade adjusunent assistance. President's Message to Congress Under Section 203(b)(l)
of the Trade Act of 1974, H.R. Doc. No. 409, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
27 !d.
28Jd.
29
Pres. Proclamation No. 4445, 3 C.F.R. 35, 35 (1976).
30
Pres. Proclamation No. 4509, 42 Fed. Reg. 30,829, 30,829 (1977).
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of footwear on September 17, 1975.31 After a public hearing and the receipt of briefs submitted by interested parties, the Commission determined
that certain items of footwear were being imported into the United States
in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to
the domestic industry or certain industries producing articles like or directly competitive with the imported articles. 32
While the Commission was unanimous concerning the need for import relief, there was no majority as to what kind of relief should be recommended. 33 Three members recommended that there be imposed a new
table of rates of duty structured to prevent or remedy the injury. 34 Two
members recommended the imposition of a tariff-rate quota system for a
five year period under which existing rates of duty would apply to footwear within the quotas and higher rates of duty would be imposed for imports in excess of quotas. 3 s Finally, one member suggested that adjustment
assistance to workers, firms, and communities could remedy the serious injury suffered by the domestic footwear industry. 36
On April 16, 1976, President Ford transmitted to Congress his decision to provide adjustment assistance to the footwear industry producing
footwear covered by the affirmative determination of the ITC. 37 In this instance, the President made a series of findings which included those required by section 203(c) of the 1974 Act:
(1) import restraints would result in higher consumer prices;
(2) import restraints would expose other industrial and agricultural trade to compensatory import concessions or retaliation
against exports which would be detrimental to United States jobs
and exports;
31 UNITED STATES INTERNATIO:-IAL TRADE Cm!MISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-7, 1 (February 20, 1976). The investigation was undertaken to determine whether "footwear, provided for in items 700.05 through 700.85, inclusive (except
items 700.51, 700.52, 700.53, and 700.60), of the Tariff Schedules of the United States," was
being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause
of serious injury, or the threat therof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article. !d.
32 !d. at 3.
33 /d. at 4.
34 !d.
3~ !d.
36 !d. at 6. See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Cm!MISSION. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATI0:-1 No. TA-201-6 (February 18, 1976) [Slide Fasteners and Parts Thereof], in which the ITC was equally divided and made no determination whether imports were
causing serious injury or a threat thereof. See also UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. T A-20 1-24 Quly 25, 1977) [Cast
Iron Stoves], in which the ITC was equally divided (2-2, with one member abstaining and one
vacancy on the Commission). In this case the two members making an affirmative determination recommended that the President should suspend designation of the subject stoves from
eligibility for duty-free treatment under the General System of Preferences. The President did
not act. See also UNITED STATES INTERNATIO!'IAL TRADE Cm!MISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-4 Qanuary 12, 1976) [Asparagus] in which the ITC was equally
divided and made no determination. The three members who voted for affirmative determination in fact recommended imposition of quantitative limitations but the President did not
act.
37 President's Message to Congress Under Section 203(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974,
H.R. Doc. No.458, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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(3) import relief would disproportionately benefit 21 larger firms
producing 50 percent of domestic output while not helping small
businesses;
(4) adjustment assistance would be less inflationary than import
relief;
(5) domestic production of footwear was already rising significantly without import relief;
(6) domestic employment was showing signs of recovery;
(7) imports of the subject footwear had been levelling off; and
(8) import relief under these circumstances would be contrary to
the policy of promoting the development of an open, nondiscriminatory and fair world economic system. 38
Accordingly, the President directed the Secretaries of Commerce and
Labor to expedite action on petitions for adjustment assistance and directed
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to monitor the United
States footwear trade in collaboration with the Bureau of Census on a
monthly basis. 39
In the year following President Ford's decision, conditions in the
footwear manufacturing industry deteriorated and the efficacy of adjustment assistance was so effectively challenged that President C~rter directed
the Departments of Commerce and Labor, together with the Special Trade
representative, to work out a new and effective Federal Trade Adjustment
Assistance Program. 40
On October 5, 1976, the ITC, in response to a Senate Finance Committee resolution directing it to conduct another investigation of footwear,
agreed that there was "good cause" within the meaning of the 1974 Act41
to reinvestigate the footwear industry within one year of reporting to the
President on the results of a like investigation. 42 After hearings, briefs and
argument from all interested parties, the ITC unanimously reached an affirmative determination that the subject footwear was being imported into
the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of
serious injury to domestic producers. 43
A majority of four Commission members agreed that to prevent or
remedy the injury found to exist, it was necessary to impose a tariff-rate
quota system on the subject footwear for the ensuing five year period. 44
38
!d. See text at note I5 supra for the requirements of § 203(c) of the 1974 Act, 19
U.S.C. § 2252(c) (I976).
39
President's Message to Congress under Section 203(b)(I) of the Trade Act of 1974,
H.R. Doc. No. 458, 94th Gong., 2d Sess. (I976). See also Memorandum for Special Repre·
sentative for Trade Negotiations, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1976).
40
13 WEEKLY Cm!P. OF PRES. Doc. 882, 883 Qune 14, 1977).
41
19 U.S.C. § 225I(e) (I976) provides:
Except for good cause determined by the Commission to exist, no investigation
for the purposes of this section shall be made with respect to the same subject
matter as a previous investigation under this section, unless I year has elapsed
since the Commission made its report to the President of the results of such pre·
vious investigation.
,
42
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Cm!mSSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON lN.
VESTIGATION No. TA-20I-I8, I (February 8, 1977) [hereinafter cited as TA-20I-I8].
43
/d. at 4.

44fd.
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Under this system, the existing rates of duty would apply to footwear
within the quotas which were established and allocated to countries on the
basis of historic market participation. 45 Shipments in excess of this quota
would be charged higher rates of duty.
Rejecting the lTC recommendation, President Carter announced his
intention to negotiate orderly marketing agreements, 46 and on June 22,
1977 anneunced the signing of agreements with the Republic of China
(Taiwan) and the Republic of Korea. 47 These agreements, effective June
28, 1977, permitted imports from these countries at a level of the "average
annual quantity or value of such articles imported into the United States
from the Republic of Korea, and from the Republic of China, in the
1974-76 period ...." 48 The President also delegated to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations his authority under section 203(e) of the
1974 Act to negotiate orderly marketing agreements with other foreign
suppliers after import relief was into effect against those countries which
had not entered into an orderly marketing agreement. 49 The Special Represeq.tative was given the power to terminate any agreement in the event
that the restraint levels specified in the agreements were exceeded, or in
the event that imports from countries not parties to such agreements increased and disrupted the effectiveness of the agreements. In addition, if
imports increased from other non-agreement countries and disrupted the
agreements, the Special Representative, after initiating consultations with
the disrupting country, could "prevent further entry of such articles for the
remainder of that restraint period or may otherwise moderate or restrict
imports of such articles from such countries pursuant to section 203(g)(2)
of the Trade Act" after consultation with representatives of the member
agencies of the Trade Policy Staff Committee. 50 As was the case with the
steel investigation, the intent of the 1974 Act was frustrated since the recommendations of the ITC were ignored and decisions were instead made
by the President and his staff.
4 :;
4

/d. at 5.

Pres. Proclamation No. 4510, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,430, 32,430 (1977).
!d. at 32,432. The "Big Five" of foreign producers exporting footwear to the United
States are:
Country
Quota Quantity (1 ,000 pairs)
Republic of China (Taiwan)
88,284
62,603
Italy
Spain
35,033
Brazil
21,324
Republic of Korea
9,202
TA-201-18, supra note 42, at 5.
4
" Pres. Proclamation No. 4510, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,429, 32,431-32 (1977).
49 /d.
:;u !d. Section 203(g)(2) of the 1974 Act provides that the President may "prescribe regulations governing the entry or withdrawal from warehouses of articles covered by such [orderly marketing] agreements." 19 U.S.C. § 2253(g)(2) (1976). Section 203(e)(1) requires import
relief to be proclaimed and take effect 90 days after a presidential determination to negotiate
orderly marketing agreements. /d. § 2253(e)(1). Thus, as to those countries not negotiating
such agreements, the lTC tariff rate quotas would apply. Such countries can continue to export to the United States products in excess of the quotas despite incurring the higher tariff
rate for the amount imported that exceeds their quota.
"

47
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3. Flatware
This was another proceeding in which the ITC made an affirmative
determination but could not muster a majority agreement as to what kind
of import relief was appropriate. 51 Three members recommended tariff~
rate quota restrictions imposing higher tariffs on imports exceeding
specified quotas, two members recommended trade adjustment assistance,
and one member recommended continuation of existing tariff {}Uotas but
without country-by-country quota allocations. 5 2
President Ford decided to provide adjustment assistance to the United
States stainless steel table flatware industry producing flatware covered by
the affirmative determination of the ITC. He rejected import relief and recited in substantially abbreviated form the factors on which he had relied in
the footwear investigation, that is, higher prices to consumers, inflationary
impact, exposure of other United States industry and agriculture to retaliation, resulting adverse impacts on jobs, undue benefit to large manufacturers and negligible help to small enterprises, and what became the standard closing invocation-the United States policy of promoting the qevelopment of an open, nondiscriminatory and fair world economic system. 53
The reasons given by the President are as faulty as they were concerning
footwear investigation, and American trade policy would have been better
served had it been formulated by the experts working with the ITC.
4. Shrimp
The ITC instituted an investigation of shrimp on December 11, 1975,
following receipt of a petition filed on November 17, 1975 by the National
Shrimp Congress, to determine whether items of shrimp, fresh, chilled,
frozen, prepared, or preserved (including pastes and sauces) were being
imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to the shrimp industry of the
United States. 54 This proceeding provided a further variation of possible
Commission alignments. Two members determined that the shrimp in
question was being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry;
two members made a negative determination; one abstained; and one de~
termined affirmately as to the shrimp-fishing industry but determined
negatively as to the shrimp-processing industry. 55 Thus, there was a
m<Uority-3 of the 5 members participating-for an affirmative determina~
tion as to the shrimp-fishing industry.
The majority recommended adjustment assistance under Chapters 2,
3, and 4 of Title II of the 1974 Act. 56 On May 17, 1977, in an unpublished
directive, President Carter authorized the submission and processing of petitions for adjustment by the shrimp-fishing industry. As should be becoming clear from this case study analysis, the President's acceptance of the
51
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN·
VESTJGATION No. TA-20I-8, I (March I, I976).
52
Id. at 5-6.
53
Pres. Proclamation No. 4436, 3 C.F.R. 26, 26-27 (I976).
54
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN·
VESTJGATION No. TA-201-12, I (May 21, 1976). Specifically the investigation concerned item
144.45 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. /d.
55 Jd.
56
/d. at 2. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of Title II are codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 227I-2374
(1976). See note 5 supra.
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lTC recommendations without change is the exception rather than the
rule.
5. Mushrooms
The lTC, pursuant to a petition filed by the Mushroom Canners
Committee of the Pennsylvania Food Processors Association and the Mushroom Processors Tariff Committee on September 17, 1975, instituted an
investigation concerning items of mushrooms. 57 Mter hearings, briefs, and
arguments the Commission by a three to two vote with one absention made
an affirmative determination and recommended adjustment assistance. 58
Despite the adjustment assistance recommended by the Commission,
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations pursuant to the direction
of the President, requested the lTC in a letter to institute an expedited investigation of mushrooms under section 201(b)(1) of the 1974 Act. 59 The
lTC determined that good cause existed for a reinvestigation within one
year of the earlier report on mushrooms, and accordingly instituted the requested investigation on October 5, 1976. 60 The lTC held further hearings,
received arguments and briefs from interested parties, and this time, by a
vote of four to one with one abstention, again made an affirmative determination. A majority of three commissioners recommended that to prevent
the injury it was necessary to impose a tariff-rate-quota system for a five
year period for the subject mushrooms with existing rates of duty applying
to imports within the designated tariff quotas and higher rates for imports
in excess of quotas fixed on a country-by-country basis.61 Two members
voted for adjustment assistance and one abstained. 62
On March 10, 1977, President Carter transmitted to Congress his decision not to impose the recommended import relief. 63 Apart from the now
standard recital about price impact on consumers and potential retaliation,
the proclamation cited recent unspecified "improvements" in the mushroom industry, the fact that only 100 jobs were at stake, the existence of
voluntary export restraints by the two leading foreign suppliers (the Republics of China and Korea), and a determination to continue to monitor both
the conditions in the industry and the availability of "consultations" with
any foreign government that becomes a "disruptive factor" in the United
States market. 64 Here again, the expertise of the lTC was ignored by the
President who despite the changes in the 1974 legislation, was still able unilaterally to change import policy.
57
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO~IMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-10, I (March 17, 1976). Specifically the investigation concerned item
144.20 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. I d.
"" Id. at 2. Curiously, two of the three members comprising the majority making the affirmative determination were joined by one member voting for a negative determination to
constitute a m;Uority of three favoring adjustment assistance. The other member comprising
the original majority of three voting for an affirmative determination opted for a five year
program of tariff-rate quotas. I d.
5
n UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO~IMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-17, 1 (January 10, 1977) [hereinafter cited as TA-201-17].
00 Id.
01
I d. at 3. Again, the member voting for negative determination joined the majority as
to the recommendation of import relief. See note 58 supra.
02
TA-201-17, supra note 59, at 4.
63
President's Message to Congress Under Section 203(b)(l) of Trade Act of 1974, H.R.
Doc. No. 96, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976).
64 I d.
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6.

Honey
The ITC, as a result of a petition filed December 29, 1975 by the
American Honey Producers Association, instituted an investigation on January 29, 1976 concerning honey. 65 Four public hearings were held in various parts of the United States and the case was briefed and argued. The
ITC, by a vote of three to two, one member abstaining, made an affirmative determination that imports were a substantial cause or a threat of serious injury to the domestic honey industry. 66 The majority recommended
that "whenever, in calendar year 1976, or in any of the four ensuing calendar years, the aggregate quantity of imports of honey, as provided for in
item 155.70 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, exceeds a tariffrate quota of 30 million pounds, honey imported during the remainder of
such calendar year shall be subject to rates of duty" which are additional to
existing duties and are specified in an ensuing table which imposes an ad
valorem schedule of duties. 67
On August 28, 1976, President Ford announced his intention to deny
the recommended import relief and to provide adjustment assistance if the
honey industry qualified. 68 In addition to the formulary recital of factors
considered-higher consumer prices, inflation, possible trade retaliation,
and the policy of development of an "open and fair world economic
system"-the proclamation set forth two paragraphs of detailed economic
data which purported to contradict the validity of the ITC's determination
that imports were a substantial cause or a threat of serious injury to the
commercial honey producers. 69 This was the first of the affirmative determination cases in which the presidential proclamation undertook more than
formulary recital of findings or summary statement of conclusions.
Subsequently, on October I, 1976, Senator Humphrey on behalf of
himself and Senators Bentson, McGovern and Nelson submitted Senate
Concurrent Resolution 210. 70 The proposed resolution, which was referred
to the Committee on Finance, expressed disapproval of "the determination
of the President under section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 transmitted to
the Congress on August 28, 1976."71 Senator Humphrey advanced detailed
economic arguments in support of the resolution. 72 However, on February
22, 1977, the Committee on Finance voted to report negatively on the resolution73 and on March 10, 1977 voted to postpone further consideration of
the matter indefinitely. 74 The House Ways and Means Committee likewise
refused to override the President. 75
65
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN.
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-14, I Gune 29, 1976) [hereinafter cited as TA-201-14]. Specifically
the investigation concerned item 155.70 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.ld. at I.
66 !d. at 3.
67
!d. at 3-4.
68
Memorandum for the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 3 C.F.R. 189,
189 (1976).
69
/d. at 189-90.
70
S. CoN. RES. No. 210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CoNG. REC. 517,871 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1976).
71 Id.
72 /d. atSI7,872.
73
Minutes of Senate Finance Committee, February 22, 1977.
74 /d., March 10, 1977.
75
Import Relief to the Domestic Honey Industry: Hearings on H. Con. Res. 80 Before the SubCom. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also H.R.
REP. No. 95-25, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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The Congress' refusal to challenge the President's decision in the
honey case is further evidence that the 1974 Act is not accomplishing its
objectives. In most situations, there has been no serious effort to muster
enough votes to override and, in this case where a serious effort was made
by prominent senators, the effort failed. Unfortunately, the draftsmen of
the 197 4 Act were probably overly optimistic in expecting Congress to
serve as an effective check on Presidential authority in the field of trade
policy.
7. Sugar
On the basis of an investigation instituted on September 21, 1976 as
the result of a resolution of the Committee on Finance of the United States
Senate, the lTC determined that items of sugars, sirups, and molasses, derived from sugar cane or sugar beets were being imported in such increased
quantities as to be a substantial threat of serious injury to the domestic industry.76 Three members recommended a quantitative restriction of 4.275
million short tons for calendar year 1977 through calendar year 1981, to be
allocated among supplying countries on a basis to be ,determined by the
President as equitable; two members recommended a quota of 4.4 million
short tons per year through 1979, to be allocated by auctioning nontransferable import licenses; and one member recommended a quota of 4.4
million short tons per year through 1981, to be allocated on the basis of a
specified table of entitlement. 77
On May 4, 1977, President Carter announced his determination that
import relief for the sugar industry was not in the national economic interest. 78 Apart from the ritual recital of undocumented ultimate "findings,"
the only additional reason given for the decision was that import relief
might jeopardize the success of pending negotiations for an International
Sugar Agreement. 79 This statement ignores the fact that the United States
operated under a quota system for 30 years (1934-1974) which adequately
protected domestic producers without jeopardizing the various international agreements negotiated during that period. 80 The efficacy of the
'jeopardy" argument is further weakened by the President's subsequent
76
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-16, 1 (March 17, 1977). The lTC instituted the investigation
to determine whether sugar beets and sugar cane; sugars, sirups, and molasses,
derived from sugar cane or sugar beets; and sugars, sirups, and molasses, described in subpart of A of part 10 of schedule 1 of the Tariff Schedules of the
United States (TSUS), flavored; and sirups, flavored or unflavored, consisting of
blends of any of the products described in aforementioned subpart A; all the
foregoing provided for in items 155.10 through 155.31, inclusive, and item
155.75 of the TSUS, [were] being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat
thereof, tq the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive
with the imported article.
I d.
On the basis of its investigation the lTC determined that "sugars, sirups, and molasses,
derived from sugar cane or sugar beets, provided for in items 155.20 and 155.30 of the TSUS
were being imported in such increased quantities as to be a substantial threat of serious injury
to the domestic industry." ld. at 3 (emphasis added). As to the other items encompassed on
the investigation, the lTC either made no determination, or a negative determination.
77 Jd. at 5-7.
78
13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 658, 658 (May 4, 1977).
79 !d.
80
See 14 WEEKLY Co~!P. OF PRES. Doc. 219, 219 Qan. 25, 1978).
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imposition of a tariff rate increase and imposition of import fees during
the pendency of these negotiations. 81 Certainly this decision will have no
less an impact on negotiations than would have a May 1977 decision to institute import relief. In lieu of import relief, the President directed the Secretary of Agriculture to institute an income support program for sugar
producers to be effective with the 1977 crop, whereby supplemental payments of a maximum of two cents per pound would be paid whenever the
market price falls below thirteen and one half cents per pound. 82
On September 29, 1977, Congress enacted legislation providing what
it considered more effective price support to domestic sugar producers. 83
Neither the presidential nor congressional price support program was effective and on November 12, 1977 President Carter announced that the
Secretary of Agriculture had advised him that the sugar items in question
"are being, or are practically certain to be, imported into the United States
under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render
ineffective, or to materially interfere with, the price support operations
now being conducted by the Department of Agriculture." 84 Accordingly,
the President ordered both an increase in the rate of tariff and an import
fee, "without awaiting the recommendations of the United States Internation Trade Commission with respect to such action."85 Thereafter, on January 20, 1978, the President announced that the Secretary of Agriculture
had once again advised him that sugar was still being imported in such
quantities as to endanger the price support program. 86 Accordingly, the
President ordered an increase in the import fees on sugar. 87
Finally, on January 25, 1978, the President announced the signing of
an International Sugar Agreement which will undertake to stabilize world
prices between 11 and 21 cents per pound by a world wide system of export quotas. 88 The President noted, "[o]nce in full operation, it should
eliminate the need for the tariff and fee measures recently imposed to defend our domestic price support program."89
8. Television
The ITC, as a res~lt of a petition filed on September 22, 1976 by
eleven labor unions and five manufacturers, instituted an investigation on
October 21, 1976 to determine whether "items of television receivers, color
and monochrome, assembled or not assembled, finished or not finished,
and subassemblies thereof' were being imported in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause or threat of serious injury. 90 Three commissioners determined affirmatively as to all of the television items in ques81

13 WEEKLYCO~IP. OF PRES. Doc. 1773, 1773 (Nov. 11, 1977).
13 WEEKLY Cm!P. OF PRES. Doc. 658, 658 (May 4, 1977).
83 The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977).
84
Pres. Proclamation No. 4538, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,037, 59,037 (1977).
85
I d. This increase is additional to a tariff rate increase imposed by Pres. Proclamation
No. 4334, 3 C.F.R. 420 (1974). The President also directed the lTC to institute a further investigation. Pres. Proclamation No. 4538, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,037, 59,037 (1977).
86
Pres. Proclamation No. 4539, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,039, 59,039 (1977).
87
14 WEEKLY Cm!P OF PRES. Doc. 219, 219 Oan. 25, 1978).
86 Id.
69 Id.
90
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Cm!MISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN.
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-19, 1 (March 22, 1977). Specifically the investigation concerned item
685.20 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. I d. at 1.
82
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tion that substantial i~ury was resulting; two commissioners determined affirmatively that color television, complete and incomplete, was threatened
with serious injury; and one member determined affirmatively that color
television receivers, assembled or not assembled, finished or not finished,
were being imported in such quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry. 91
The aforementioned three member bloc recommended imposition of
additional rates of duty over the existing rate of duty for the next five
years at the level of twenty percent the first two years, fifteen percent for
the next two ensuing years, and ten percent the fifth year; the aforementioned two member bloc recommended identical relief but confined it to
color television receivers, complete or incomplete; the aforementioned
single member recommended imposition of a quantitative restriction of
1,272,000 units per annum on a global basis, with quarterly limitations, to
be increased at the rate of five percent per year for each year in which the
quota is in effect. 92
On June 24, 1977, President Carter announced that as to monochrome televison he interpreted the lTC as being evenly divided and he
opted "to accept the determination of those commissioners making no determination of injury to the monochrome television receiver industry as the
determination of the Commission and to accept the determination of those
commissioners finding serious injury to that portion of the industry producing subassemblies of color television receivers as the determination of
the Commission." 93 However, the President rejected the recommended import relief and determined "to .remedy the serious injury found to exist by
the USITC through the negotiation of an orderly marketing agreement
with Japan, the major supplier of color television receivers to the U.S.
Market." 94 An orderly marketing agreement was concluded with Japan on
May 20, 1977 restricting imports for a period of three years beginning July
1, 1977 to 1.75 million units in each annual restraint period. 95
9. Iron Blue Pigments
The lTC, as a result of a petition filed on October 2, 1975 by American Cyanamid Co., instituted an investigation on October 30 concerning
the importation of ferrocyanide and ferrocyanide blue pigments.96 On the
basis of its investigation, three members of the ITC determined that increased imports were a threat of serious injury, two members found increased imports to be a substantial cause of serious injury and one member
made a negative determination. 9.7 The five members reaching an affirmative determination recommended increased rates of tariff above existing
rates for a five year period. 98
at 3.
n1d. at 4-5.
93
Pres. Proclamation No. 4511, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,747, 32,748 (1977).
94Jd.
9
~ I d. at 32,748-49.
96 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-11, 1 (April 2, 1976). Specifically the investigation concerned item
473.28 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. I d.
97 I d. at 3.
OS Jd.
~ 1 ld.
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On May 31, 1976, President Ford announced that he had determined
that the relief recommended by the ITC was not in the national interest. 99
One of the principal reasons for this decision, apart from the undocumented recitation of ultimate conclusions, was that "[t]he great bulk of
domestic iron blue pigments production is accounted for by two large
multi-product firms whose overall operations in recent years showed growing profits except in the 1975 recession .... With the resources available to
such large producers, they should be able to finance any investment necessary to improve their competitive position vis-a-vis imports without tariff relief."100 The President did provide for applications for adjustment assistance if necessary due to unemployment. 101 Thus, the adverse impacts of
foreign trade were to be jointly absorbed by industry and the American
taxpayer. Once again it becomes clear that the 1974 Act accomplished little
towards improving American trade policy and changing the allocation of
decision-making responsibility.
10. Pending Cases
There are three ITC reports awaiting presidential action as of February 15, 1978.102 In each investigation the ITC has made an affirmative determination and in two of the three cases has mustered a majority of members in agreement as to the appropriate import relief.
B. Need for Further Reforrn
As can be seen by an analysis of the decided investigations, the Trade
Act of 1974 unfortunately has not been very effective and there is need for
further reform. Presidents have largely ignored ITC recommendations and
have failed to explain and document their findings. Furthermore, the Congress has failed to exert a significant influence on United States import policy since the enactment of the 1974 Act.
Of the nine investigations completed since the enactment of the 1974
Act in which the ITC has made affirmative determinations and mustered a
majority agreement on what import relief should be implemented, in only
three cases, specialty ste~l, shrimp and footwear, did the President ultimately adopt the import relief recommended by the ITC. In two of the
three cases, the presidential adoption was only part of the relief the ITC
recommended. In the case of specialty steel, the President imposed quantitative restrictions only after he had failed to negotiate orderly marketing
agreements, and since imposing the restrictions he has whittled away at the
scope of the protection. In the footwear case, the President succeeded in
99

Presidential Memorandum, 3 C.F.R. 181, 181 (1976).
/d. (emphasis added).
101 !d.
102
The three cases are UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Co~IMISSION, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-28 (December 1, 1978) [High Carbon Ferrochromium], in which a majority made an affirmative determination and proposed additional
rates of duty as the remedy; UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Co~IMISSION, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-27 (December 12, 1978) [Bolts, Nuts and Large
Screws of Iron or Steel], in which a majority made an affirmative determination and proposed
increased rates of duty as the remedy; and UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE CoMMISSION,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-29 (February 2, 1978) (Citizens Band
(CB) Radio Transceivers], in which a majority made an affirmative determination but divided
(3-3) as to what import relief should be adopted.
100
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negotiating orderly marketing agreements with two of the "Big Five" competitors. In the case of shrimp, the President and the ITC agreed that adjustment assistance was appropriate.
The case of sugar is unique. Mter originally rejecting quantitative restrictions recommended by the ITC, the President instead proposed adjustment assistance in the form of price supports. When price supports
proved inadequate, the President was compelled to increase the tariff and
to impose import fees. Thus, having initially rejected the sugar quotas recommended by the ITC, current presidential policy appears to rely on a system of world quotas bolstered by the congressional price support program
authorized by the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. 103
In the remaining six cases, the President has successfully ignored the
ITC recommendations for import relief despite the provisions for accountability to Congress contained in the 1974 Act. In only one of these six
cases, the honey investigation, 104 did the Congress sustain the President's
position. 105
Equally disturbing is the manner in which the President has overridden the lTC. The proclamations announcing overrides contain mostly
ritual recitals of the findings required by the 1974 Act with virtually no
supporting documentation. In many instances the proclamations do not
contain a complete recital of the required ultimate findings. In contrast, the
lTC reports are extensively documented by evidence adduced at public
hearings and informed by the filing of adversary briefs and argument. The
lTC members are supported by an expert technical staff and by an accumulated expertise in dealing with the substantive aspects of trade disputes.
The ITC reports are also supported by field work and interviews conducted by its staff, by information from other relevant federal agencies and
by information obtained by systematic questionnaires. It is also important to
note that in only one case, the honey investigation, has Congress even
undertaken a resolution to override the President. 106 Given the ovenvhelming workload of the Congress, it is not remarkable that it has not exercised
its override powers more frequently. The President's rejection of most ITC
recommendations and Congress' inability to exert influence concerning
trade policy strongly indicate the need for further reform if the objective
of liberalized and effective import relief is to be realized. To this end, Congress should amend the 1974 Act to make the decision of the ITC granting
import relief final unless the President assumes the burden of proof before
the Congressional Oversight Committee 107 that another course of action
should be adopted. This arrangement would offer several significant advantages. First, it would compel the President when he differs with the ITC
to document his disagreement with probative, substantive evidence. Under
the present system, the lTC produces a detailed factual exposition to support its determination and recommendations. Yet, the President has overruled these considered decisions in summary fashion supported in most
cases only by formulary recitals of findings. Under the proposed system,
Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977).
TA-201-14, supra note 65.
H.R. REP. No. 25, 95 Cong., lst Sess. (1977).
106 S. CoN. RE.S. No. 210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. Sl7,871 (daily ed. Oct. I,
J03
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1976).
101

See note 17 supra.
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when differences arise between the ITC and the President, the differences
would be resolved on the basis of fully documented presentations from
both the President and the ITC. Inescapably, the quality of analysis, both at
the ITC and in the White House, would benefit from this proposed change
in legislation.
The second major advantage of this proposal would be the elimination of the President's reliance on undisclosed foreign policy and political
considerations which motivate the President in the discharge of his trade
responsibilities. If the President were required to adduce and document
persuasive, substantive reasons for his proposed override of an ITC decision, this would assure that the presidential position prevails only on the
merits and not because of undisclosed political or foreign policy objectives
that are not legally germane to trade policy decision-making.
A third advantage would be that this system would "de-politicize" the
present process. When an industry receives an ITC recommendation for import relief and the President overrides the recommendation, the only recourse
the industry currently has is to organize, if possible, political pressure, usually
in the Congress. Normally the larger and more affluent industries are able to
lobby effectively in Congress, and smaller, more vulnerable industries are less
able to exert the pressure necessary to redress the situation.
Another, and perhaps more speculative, advantage would be that such a
system, by requiring detailed substantive reasons, would probably reduce the
number of attempted Presidential overrides and thereby reduce the workload
of the Joint Congressional Oversight group.
CONCLUSION
The innovations in the 1974 Act which sought to liberalize access to
import relief, to strengthen the ITC's independence, and to make the President
more accountable by an increased congressional oversight of his disposition of
ITC recommendations were inspired by the perception that the United States
position in world trade was seriously deteriorating. After World War II, the
United States premised its trade and monetary policies upon the assumption
that it could sustain a balance of trade surplus. By 1966 this was no longer the
case. 108 Moreover, during the decade of the 1960's United States worker
productivity-output per man-hour for manufacturing employees-was declining, domestic prices and wages were increasing steeply, and by 1970 the
effective rate of exchange of the United States dollar had declined.
In the period since enactment of the 1974 Act, the foregoing situation has
worsened, chiefly as a result of the steeply increased cost of energy due to
OPEC price increases, but also due to some extent to increased prices for basic
commodities from "Third World" countries. Continued unacceptable levels of
108
Until the 1974 Act, import statistics were collected and reported on a free on board
(f.o.b.) basis which, because it excludes the cost of freight and insurance, produces an understatement of total costs actually incurred. Since the 1974 Act, import statistics must be reported on a cost, insurance and freight (c.i.f.) basis, bringing United States practice into harmony with the practice of most other industrialized nations and the International Monetary
Fund. Thus, during the entire decade of the 1960s there appeared to be a surplus on the f.o.b.
basis, whereas since 1966 there has in fact been a deficit. Moreover, United States export statistics have been further overstated Because of the inclusion of exports that arc more in the nature of aid rather than trade.
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inflation and unemployment aggravate the problem. Additionally, Congress
has become increasingly concerned with the enormous cost of compliance with
United States environmental laws and regulations, 109 and with the effect of this
on the ability of United States producers to compete effectively with foreign
producers. 110
It is probable, therefore, that given these worsened conditions, Congress
would be all the more eager to assure that the counterforces it attempted to set
in play in 1974 should be effectively implemented at this time. Simply compelling the President to assume the burden of proof whenever he opposed an lTC
recommendation would be the simplest and most effective means of correcting
the deficiency in the present trade decision-making procedure. The objectives
of Congress in the 1974 Act would no longer be thwarted and the quality of the
substantive analysis on which United States trade policy is based would inevitably be enhanced.
109
Congress enacted provisions in the Ta.x Reform Act of 1976 which provide for a
special environmental investment ta.>: credit. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2112, 90 Stat. 1521 (1976).
President Carter has recognized the need for doubling this environment investment tax credit.
Proposed Ta.x Reform, Message from the President, 124 CONG. REC. 5236 (1978). See also
Whitney, Capital Fonnation Options to Finance Pollution Control, 3 COLUM.j. ENVTL L. 42 (1976).
110
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 6, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
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